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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
POLLAK, District Judge 
 
 Appellants in this case seek to represent a putative 
class of aliens who are detained, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(c), pending their removal proceedings.  The class 
complaint, filed in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania, sought a declaratory 
judgment that the continued detention of the class members, 
4 
without bond hearings, violates the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.  The District Court denied the class 
certification motion and dismissed the class complaint, 
finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) deprived the court of 
subject matter jurisdiction to entertain an application for 
declaratory relief on behalf of the plaintiff class.  Section 
1252(f)(1) precludes class actions that seek to “enjoin or 
restrain the operation of” several immigration statutes, 
including 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).  The District Court concluded 
that “restrain” encompasses declaratory relief.  We reverse. 
I. 
 Appellants Alexander Alli and Elliot Grenade are 
lawful permanent residents whom the government deems 
removable from the United States as a result of past criminal 
convictions.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).  Appellants were 
detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c),1 which provides that 
the Attorney General “shall take into custody any alien who . 
. . is deportable by reason of having committed” certain 
enumerated offenses.2
After Alli and Grenade had been detained for, 
respectively, 9 months and 20 months, they filed a combined 
habeas petition and civil complaint alleging that their 
continued detention violated the INA and the Due Process 
Clause.  They sought, inter alia, an order directing the 
government to provide them with a bond hearing.  In addition 
 
                                              
1 In the District Court, appellant Grenade argued that part of 
his detention could not be authorized by § 1226(c), and 
instead asserted that the detention came under § 1226(a), 
which allows the Attorney General to release a detained alien 
on bond.  The dispute is not relevant to the issue we confront 
on appeal.  
2 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred most 
immigration-related functions of the Attorney General—
including the detention authority at issue in this case—to the 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security.  See 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 
Stat. 2135.  For the sake of convenience, we use the term 
Attorney General as contained in the statutes. 
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to their individual claims, appellants sought to represent a 
class of lawful permanent residents residing in Pennsylvania 
or, in the alternative, in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, 
who had been or would be detained without hearing, pursuant 
to § 1226(c), for over six months.  The putative class sought a 
declaration that the failure to afford such a hearing violates 
the INA and the Due Process Clause. 
The District Court granted appellants’ individual 
petitions but refused to consider their class claims, finding 
that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) stripped it of jurisdiction to 
entertain a class action requesting declaratory relief.  The 
government did not appeal the ruling on the individual 
petitions, but appellants sought review of the class decision. 
II. 
A. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary review over legal 
conclusions associated with orders dismissing claims for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction.  White-Squire v. U.S. Postal 
Serv., 592 F.3d 453, 456 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 Although not raised by either party, we briefly address 
a procedural wrinkle that implicates the mootness doctrine.  
The District Court denied appellants’ motion for class 
certification on August 10, 2009.  Dkt. 56.  In the same order, 
the District Court dismissed the portions of appellants’ 
complaint and habeas petition that sought class relief.  But on 
January 26, 2010, the District Court ruled that both of 
appellants’ detentions were unreasonably prolonged, and thus 
ordered individualized bond hearings for each appellant.3
                                              
3 Neither appellant actually received a bond hearing.  Instead, 
Alli was immediately released on no bond and, after a 
conference with the District Court, the parties agreed to a 
form of conditional release for Grenade. 
  
Dkt. 88.  Accordingly, appellants no longer have a personal 
stake in the merits of the class claim.  Nevertheless, because 
the denial of class certification occurred when appellants’ 
individual claims were still live, their appeal is not moot.  See 
6 
U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980) 
(“[A]n action brought on behalf of a class does not become 
moot upon expiration of the named plaintiff’s substantive 
claim, even though class certification has been denied.”); 
Rosetti v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 1216, 1226 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[A] 
federal appellate court retains jurisdiction over a named 
plaintiff’s challenge to a denial of class certification, even if 
the plaintiff has not maintained a personal stake in the 
outcome of the litigation since that decision.”).  We may 
therefore review the District Court’s conclusion that § 
1252(f)(1) deprived it of jurisdiction to certify appellants’ 
class claim for declaratory relief. 
B. 
 Section 1252(f)(1) provides: 
Regardless of the nature of the action or claim 
or of the identity of the party or parties bringing 
the action, no court (other than the Supreme 
Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to 
enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions 
of part IV of this sub-chapter, as amended by 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996, other than with 
respect to the application of such provisions to 
an individual alien against whom proceedings 
under such part have been initiated.4
At issue in this case is whether the term “restrain,” in § 
1252(f)(1), encompasses, and thus bars, appellants’ class 
 
                                              
4 Section 1252(f)(1) was enacted as part of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-
546.  “[M]any provisions of IIRIRA are aimed at protecting 
the Executive’s discretion from the courts—indeed, that can 
fairly be said to be the theme of the legislation.”  Reno v. 
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 
486 (1999) (emphasis omitted). 
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claim for declaratory relief regarding § 1226(c) 5 detention 
practices.6
                                              
5 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) is a “provision[] of part IV of this 
subchapter.”  Section 1252(f)(1) is in subchapter II of Chapter 
12.  Part IV of subchapter II, “Inspection, Apprehension, 
Examination, Exclusion, and Removal,” includes 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1221–1232. 
 
6 In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 
525 U.S. 471 (1999), the Supreme Court addressed the 
meaning of § 1252(f), albeit only in passing.  The Court 
sought to determine the limits of § 1252(g), which restricts 
judicial review of the Attorney General’s “decision or action” 
to “commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute 
removal orders against any alien under this Act.”  The Ninth 
Circuit had found that § 1252(g) was limited by § 1252(f), 
which the Ninth Circuit had described as an affirmative grant 
of jurisdiction.  In rejecting this conclusion, the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of § 1252(f) was limited to a determination 
of whether § 1252(f) is a grant of or limit on federal court 
jurisdiction.  In that regard, the Court observed that “[b]y its 
plain terms, and even by its title, that provision [§1252(f)] is 
nothing more or less than a limit on injunctive relief.”  Id. at 
481.  Thus, the Reno Court did not, as we must do here, 
address the scope of § 1252(f)(1), but instead simply 
determined that § 1252(f) is a limit on jurisdiction.  We 
cannot, therefore, treat Reno as controlling on the more 
specific question of the meaning of “restrain.”  
 
 
The parties agree that use of the disjunctive “or” 
demands that “restrain” have some meaning other than 
“enjoin.”  See Chalmers v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 752, 755 (3d Cir. 
1994) (“We see no basis to construe the disjunctive ‘or’ in 
any way other than its plain meaning . . . .”); see also 
Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(“[W]hen interpreting a statute, courts should endeavor to 
give meaning to every word which Congress used and 
therefore should avoid an interpretation which renders an 
element of the language superfluous.”). 
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 But the parties dispute what we may and may not 
consider in construing the statute.  Appellants argue that the 
meaning of “restrain” may be derived by reference to the 
statute’s context (including neighboring provisions), while the 
government contends that resort to statutory context is only 
appropriate where the term in question is ambiguous.  The 
government claims (and the District Court found) that 
“restrain” is not ambiguous, but merely broad, and thus that it 
is improper to consult the provision’s context.  See Appellees’ 
Br. at 31 (“Ambiguity . . . may [not] be read into a statutory 
term or phrase simply because Congress used a different term 
or phrase in another part of the same statute.”); Alli v. Decker, 
644 F.Supp.2d 535, 549 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (“That Congress 
employed different language in another portion of the statute 
does not change [the] plain meaning [of ‘restrain’].”).  
It is true that “[w]here the statutory language is 
unambiguous, the court should not consider statutory purpose 
or legislative history,” Parker v. NutriSystem, Inc., 620 F.3d 
274, 277 (3d Cir. 2010), and that “‘the title of a statute . . . 
cannot limit the plain meaning of the text,’” Dep’t of 
Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1988) (quoting 
Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29 
(1947)).  But neither the government nor the District Court 
has cited to any authority that requires a court to ignore other 
provisions within a statute when making the threshold 
ambiguity determination.7
                                              
7 For example, Florida Department of Revenue. v. Piccadilly 
Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33 (2008), did not, as the 
government contends, treat facial ambiguity as a prerequisite 
to contextual interpretation.  In fact, the Piccadilly Court 
suggested that contextual interpretation is a permissible 
means of discerning ambiguity.  See id. at 47 (considering, 
then rejecting, contextual arguments, and noting that “even if 
we were fully to accept Piccadilly’s textual and contextual 
arguments, they would establish at most that the statutory 
language is ambiguous.”).  The District Court’s citation to 
Kaufman v. Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 144, 155 
(3d Cir. 2009) is also inapposite.  In Kaufman, we observed 
that “when the plain meaning cannot be derived, the provision 
at issue must be viewed in the context of the statute as a 
whole.”  Id.  But it does not follow that a court may assess the 
  Indeed, “[t]he Supreme Court has 
9 
stated consistently that the text of a statute must be 
considered in the larger context or structure of the statute in 
which it is found.”  United States v. Tupone, 442 F.3d 145, 
151 (3d Cir. 2006); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (“In determining 
whether Congress has specifically addressed the question at 
issue, a reviewing court should not confine itself to 
examining a particular statutory provision in isolation.  The 
meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may 
only become evident when placed in context.”).  Accordingly, 
the District Court’s approach to discerning the existence of 
ambiguity—an approach based on dictionary definitions—
was insufficient.  See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 
(1994) (“Ambiguity is a creature not of definitional 
possibilities but of statutory context.”).8
                                                                                                     
context of the statute only if “the plain meaning cannot be 
derived” in isolation. 
 
 
8 Thus it may be true that, as the District Court found, class 
declaratory relief would “restrain” the operation of the 
detention statutes if “restrain” were interpreted solely under 
its broad dictionary definition.  See, e.g., 2 Oxford English 
Dictionary 554 (Compact ed. 1971) (defining “restrain” as 
“[t]o check, hold back, or prevent (a person or thing) from 
some course of action . . . .”).  But the Supreme Court has 
noted that 
 
[t]he definition of words in isolation . . . is not 
necessarily controlling in statutory construction.  
A word in a statute may or may not extend to 
the outer limits of its definitional possibilities.  
Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon 
reading the whole statutory text, considering the 
purpose and context of the statute, and 
consulting any precedents or authorities that 
inform the analysis. 
 
Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006).  We 
accordingly decline to confine ourselves to the dictionary 
definitions proffered by the government. 
10 
We therefore turn to the statutory context of § 
1252(f)(1).  A closely adjacent provision, § 1252(e)(1)(A), 
precludes courts from entering “declaratory, injunctive, or 
other equitable relief in any action pertaining to an order to 
exclude an alien . . . .”  This provision is compelling evidence 
that Congress knew how to preclude declaratory relief, but 
chose not to in § 1252(f)(1).  See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 
480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) (“‘[Where] Congress includes 
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 
inclusion or exclusion.’” (quoting Russello v. United States, 
464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))).  In Nken v. Holder, the Supreme 
Court followed this presumption in interpreting § 1252(f)(2), 
immediately adjacent to the provision at issue here, and noted 
that the presumption was “particularly true . . . where [the] 
subsections . . . were enacted as part of a unified overhaul of 
judicial review procedures.”  See Nken v. Holder, 129 S.Ct. 
1749, 1759 (2009). 
Even if the contrast between “enjoin or restrain” in § 
1252(f)(1) and “declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable 
relief” in § 1252(e)(1)(A) does not, by itself, demonstrate that 
“restrain” does not encompass declaratory relief, it at least 
underscores an ambiguity that encourages consideration of 
§ 1252(f)(1)’s section heading.  See Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. 
Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47 (2008) 
(“[S]tatutory titles and section headings are ‘tools available 
for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a statute.’”) 
(quoting Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 528 (2002) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  The title of § 1252(f), “Limit on 
injunctive relief,” counsels in favor of interpreting “restrain” 
as referring to a form of injunctive relief.  This reading is 
reinforced by the broader heading of § 1252(e)(1), 
“Limitations on relief.”  As noted above, § 1252(e)(1)—
unlike § 1252(f)(1)—expressly bars jurisdiction over both 
injunctive and declaratory relief.  We therefore read “Limit 
on injunctive relief” to mean what it says, and we conclude 
that “restrain” refers to one or more forms of temporary 
injunctive relief, such as a temporary restraining order or 
preliminary injunction. 
11 
In sum, viewing the provision in context and then 
taking into consideration the heading of the provision, it is 
apparent that the jurisdictional limitations in § 1252(f)(1) do 
not encompass declaratory relief.  This moderate construction 
of “restrain” is in keeping with the Supreme Court’s 
instruction that statutes limiting equitable relief are to be 
construed narrowly.  See Porter v. Warren Holding Co., 328 
U.S. 395, 398 (1946) (“Unless a statute in so many words, or 
by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court’s 
jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to 
be recognized and applied.”); see also Samuels v. Mackell, 
401 U.S. 66, 70 (1971) (“[A] suit for declaratory judgment 
[is] . . . ‘essentially an equitable cause of action’ . . . .” 
(quoting Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 
U.S. 293, 300 (1943))).9  Our conclusion is consistent with 
the Ninth Circuit’s holding on the identical question, and with 
the First Circuit’s conclusion in a slightly different context.  
See Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1119 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2003).10
C. 
 
                                              
9 Moreover, our reading is informed by the general rule that 
“the narrower construction of a jurisdiction-stripping 
provision is favored over the broader one.”  Ana Int’l v. Way, 
393 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Reno v. American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 480–82 
(1999)). 
 
10 In Arevalo, the First Circuit was called upon to interpret § 
1252(f)(2), which provides that “no court shall enjoin the 
removal of any alien pursuant to a final order under this 
section unless the alien shows by clear and convincing 
evidence that the entry or execution of such order is 
prohibited as a matter of law.”  Judge Selya, writing for the 
panel, ruled that “enjoin” in that provision does not 
encompass stays pending review of a final order of removal.  
Judge Selya’s § 1252(f)(1) finding—that “restrain” in 
§1252(f)(1) refers to “temporary injunctive relief (such as 
stays)”—was thus primarily used to buttress his answer to the 
§ 1252(f)(2) question, and it did not address the question of 
declaratory relief.  Nevertheless, we find Arevalo’s reasoning 
persuasive on the issue we confront in this case. 
12 
 The government contends that “restrain” should be 
construed to include declaratory relief because, in this 
context, such relief is the functional equivalent of injunctive 
relief.  Specifically, the government contends that our 
interpretation leads to “an absurd result” by creating a “cause-
of-action loophole that stops just short of ordering injunctive 
relief but establishes on a class-wide basis the right to such 
injunctive relief.”  Appellees’ Br. at 29; see also, e.g., Lamie 
v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“It is well 
established that when the statute’s language is plain, the sole 
function of the courts—at least where the disposition required 
by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its 
terms.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 Under certain circumstances, declaratory relief has 
been deemed “functionally equivalent” to injunctive relief.  
For example, in California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 
U.S. 393 (1982), the Supreme Court assessed whether 
declaratory relief was permissible under the Tax Injunction 
Act, which provides that district courts “shall not enjoin, 
suspend or restrain the . . . collection of any tax under State 
law . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (emphasis added).  In ruling that 
the Act precludes both injunctive and declaratory relief, the 
Court observed that “the declaratory judgment ‘procedure 
may in every practical sense operate to suspend collection of 
the state taxes until the litigation is ended,’” Grace Brethren 
Church, 457 U.S. at 408 (quoting Great Lakes Dredge & 
Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 299 (1943)), and that a 
prohibition on declaratory relief was consistent with the 
“principal purpose” of the Act: “‘to limit drastically federal 
district court jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local 
concern as the collection of taxes.’”  Id. at 408 (quoting 
Rosswell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 522 (1981)).11
                                              
11 As a textual matter, it is not clear that Grace Brethren 
compellingly supports the government’s position that 
“restrain” includes declaratory relief.  The Court did not 
expressly state whether “suspend” or “restrain”—or, perhaps, 
the combination of the two—encompassed declaratory relief.  
And to the extent the Court did tie its analysis to a particular 
term, it appears that the Court read “suspend”—which is 
absent from § 1252(f)(1)—to refer to declaratory relief.  See 
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 But declaratory relief will not always be the functional 
equivalent of injunctive relief.  In Steffel v. Thompson, the 
Supreme Court noted that “‘[t]he express purpose of the 
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act was to provide a milder 
alternative to the injunction remedy.’”  415 U.S. 452, 467 
(1974) (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 111 (1971) 
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).  The 
Steffel Court noted that “[t]he only occasions where this Court 
has . . . found that a preclusion of injunctive relief inevitably 
led to a denial of declaratory relief have been cases in which 
principles of federalism militated altogether against federal 
intervention in a class of adjudications.”  Id. at 472; see also 
id. at 462 (“When no state proceeding is pending and thus 
considerations of equity, comity, and federalism have little 
vitality, the propriety of granting federal declaratory relief 
may properly be considered independently of a request for 
injunctive relief.”).12
                                                                                                     
Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 408 (“[T]he Act divests 
the district court . . . of jurisdiction to take actions that 
‘suspend or restrain’ the assessment and collection of state 
taxes.  Because the declaratory judgment procedure may in 
every practical sense suspend collection of state taxes until 
the litigation is ended, the very language of the Act suggests 
that a federal court is prohibited from issuing declaratory 
relief . . . .”(emphasis added)); see also Rodriguez, 591 F.3d 
at 1119 (“[T]he conspicuous absence of suspend in 
[§ 1252(f)(1)] suggests that Congress intended Section 
1252(f)’s scope to be more limited than the Tax Injunction 
and Johnson Acts.”). 
 
12 The government relies on National Union Fire Insurance 
Co. v. City Savings to support its argument that declaratory 
and injunctive relief are, in this context, equivalent.  
Appellees’ Br. at 39.  In National Union, we held that a 
jurisdiction-stripping statute includes an implicit prohibition 
on declaratory relief.  28 F.3d 376, 389–90 (3d Cir. 1994).  
We further held that the prohibition was consistent with due 
process because it did not entirely preclude the opportunity to 
be heard, it merely delayed such opportunity.  Id. at 390–91.  
We buttressed this ruling by citation to an analogous holding 
in Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974)—
which assessed a due process challenge to a statute stripping 
14 
 The reasoning of Steffel significantly undermines the 
government’s wholesale attempt to equate declaratory and 
injunctive relief, and it supports the conclusion that our 
reading of § 1252(f)(1) would not produce “an absurd result.”  
The distinct purpose and effect of a declaration, as compared 
to an injunction, presents an entirely plausible basis upon 
which Congress might choose to bar one form of relief but 
not the other.  Moreover, in this context a classwide 
declaration would not—indeed, by the plain terms of the 
statute, could not—form the basis for classwide injunctive 
relief.  Though appellants do not dispute that class members 
could pursue individual injunctions after issuance of a 
classwide declaration, see Steffel, 415 U.S. at 461 n.11 
(“[U]nder 28 U.S.C. § 2202 a declaratory judgment might 
serve as the basis for issuance of a later injunction . . . .”), 
such individual relief is expressly permitted under § 
1252(f)(1).13
                                                                                                     
courts of jurisdiction to award injunctive relief—and we 
stated that Bob Jones was apposite because “‘there is little 
practical difference between injunctive and declaratory 
relief.’”  Id. at 391 n.17 (quoting Grace Brethren Church, 457 
U.S. at 408).  Thus, we found that the due process concerns 
raised by a statute barring declaratory relief were equivalent 
to the due process concerns raised by a statute barring 
injunctive relief. 
 
But the government fails to explain why the remedial 
equivalency in National Union mandates a similar finding of 
equivalency in this case.  We are concerned here with the 
practical effect of allowing declaratory relief, whereas 
National Union discussed the constitutional effect of barring 
declaratory relief.  Moreover, we need only find that 
Congress had a plausible basis for finding that, in this 
context, declarations and injunctions are not equivalent.  As 
discussed above, the distinct purposes and effects of the two 
remedies are a sufficient basis.  We accordingly decline to 
read National Union as a categorical pronouncement of the 
equivalency of declaratory and injunctive relief. 
 
13 We recognize that the judiciary has “long presumed that 
officials of the Executive Branch will adhere to the law as 
declared by the court.”  Comm. on Judiciary v. Miers, 542 
15 
Finally, as one respected scholar has noted, allowing 
classwide declaratory relief would “facilitate the Supreme 
Court review that Congress apparently intended.”  See Gerald 
L. Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in Immigration Law, 78 
TEX. L. REV. 1661, 1686–87 (2000); see also 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(f)(1) (“. . . no court (other than the Supreme Court) 
shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain . . . .” 
(emphasis added)).  The Supreme Court could not exercise 
original jurisdiction over such a class action, and “[a]n 
appellate jurisdiction necessarily implies some judicial 
determination, some judgment, decree, or order of an inferior 
tribunal, from which an appeal could be taken.”  The Alicia, 
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 571 (1869).  “If instead section 1252(f)(1) 
were interpreted as permitting classwide declaratory—but not 
injunctive—relief in the lower courts, there would be a 
justiciable class action that could be subjected to appellate 
review.”  Neuman, 78 TEX. L. REV. at 1686.  Thus Professor 
Neuman has articulated an additional reason that our 
interpretation of “restrain” would not lead to an unreasonable 
result. 
In summary, we conclude that construing § 1252(f)(1) 
to permit class declaratory relief would not produce an 
“absurd result.”  We accordingly decline the government’s 
invitation to disregard the most natural reading of the statute. 
*  *  *  *  * 
                                                                                                     
F.3d 909, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  But we also note that the 
Department of Justice has recently taken the position that, at 
least under certain circumstances, this presumption applies 
only after appellate review is exhausted.  Defendant’s Motion 
to Clarify at 4, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human 
Services, No. 10-cv-91 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2011) (“[The] 
injunction-like effect of a declaratory judgment against 
defendants . . . would apply after appellate review is 
exhausted.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Though the 
district judge in that case rejected the government’s view of 
the effect of the declaratory judgment, see id. ECF No. 167 at 
12–13, we are satisfied, for the purposes of this case, that 
Congress had at least a plausible basis for believing that 
declaratory and injunctive relief would have different effects. 
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The problem in this case is to determine the scope of 
what Congress intended in using the word “restrain” in § 
1252(f)(1).  The government places particular emphasis on 
that term’s dictionary definitions.  We think that, in 
construing a statute, dictionary definitions may be helpful 
starting points, but over-reliance on dictionaries—to the 
exclusion of sources such as adjacent statutory provisions—
can lead a court astray.  As we have noted previously, see 
supra note 8, the Supreme Court has given prudent counsel: 
“Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the 
whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of 
the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that 
inform the analysis.”  Dolan, 546 U.S. at 486.  Accordingly, 
we (1) reverse the District Court’s dismissal of those portions 
of appellants’ amended habeas petition and civil complaint 
that sought class relief, (2) vacate the district court’s denial of 
class certification, and (3) remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge, Dissenting. 
 The Majority concludes that, although 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(f)(1) prohibits class action relief to “enjoin or restrain” 
immigration laws that regulate the detention of aliens 
convicted of crimes pending their removal, these 
jurisdictional limitations “do not encompass declaratory 
relief.”  Maj. Op. at 11.  I disagree because a class action for 
declaratory relief has the effect of restraining the operation of 
laws, like 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), that regulate pre-removal 
detention in immigration proceedings—precisely what the 
plain text of § 1252(f)(1) prohibits.  
 The statute at issue in this case provides as follows: 
Regardless of the nature of the action or claim 
or of the identity of the party or parties bringing 
the action, no court (other than the Supreme 
Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to 
enjoin or restrain the operation of the 
provisions of part IV of this subchapter, as 
amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, other 
than with respect to the application of such 
provisions to an individual alien against whom 
proceedings under such part have been initiated. 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) (emphases added).  Although this 
provision bars class action suits to “enjoin or restrain” the 
immigration laws that regulate the detention of aliens subject 
to removal, Alli argues that, by its plain language, § 
1252(f)(1) contains no prohibition on declaratory relief.  He 
points out that the text does not use the term “declaratory” 
and that the section is entitled “Limit on Injunctive Relief.”  I 
find these arguments unpersuasive.  The real issue in this case 
is whether the word “restrain” bars a class claim for 
declaratory relief that would have the same practical effect as 
a class claim for injunctive relief.  The Majority concludes 
that it does not because the word “restrain” refers to 
“temporary injunctive relief.”  Maj. Op. at 11.  This is 
incompatible with the Majority’s conclusion that the word 
“restrain” should have a meaning different from the word 
“enjoin.”  Maj. Op. at 8.  In my view, while the term “enjoin” 
refers to injunctive relief—including the temporary kind—the 
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term “restrain” is a broad one that includes, among other 
things, declaratory relief.  For this reason, I respectfully 
dissent.   
The District Court rejected Alli's interpretation of § 
1252(f)(1) and, for several reasons, I find its analysis 
persuasive.  First, because we endeavor to interpret statutes 
according to their “ordinary meaning,” Chapman v. United 
States, 500 U.S. 453, 462 (1991), I find dictionary definitions 
helpful.  See Massie v. United States Dep't of Housing and 
Urban Dev., 620 F.3d 340, 356 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that the 
dictionary is the “proper starting place for ascertaining the 
plain meaning of words”).  In this case, those definitions 
comport with common-sense understanding.  The word 
“restrain” means “restrict, limit, confine,” and “to hold back 
from action; keep in check or under control; repress.”  The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1487 
(4th ed. 2009); Random House Webster’s Unabridged 
Dictionary 1642 (2d ed. 1998); The Compact Oxford English 
Dictionary 1573 (2d ed. 1989).   
 A class-wide declaratory judgment that aliens detained 
pursuant to § 1226(c) must receive an individualized hearing, 
as the Majority would allow, necessarily “restricts or limits” 
the Executive Branch’s implementation of that statute.  I find 
nothing ambiguous about this result.1
                                              
1 The Majority asserts that, because the “injunction-like effect 
of a declaratory judgment” action does not occur until after 
appellate review is exhausted, Congress could plausibly 
assume that the effect of a declaratory judgment is different 
from the effect of an injunction.  Maj. Op. at 15 n.13.  This is 
indicative of the Majority's penchant for elevating form over 
substance.  The timing of a judgment's effect has no bearing 
on its substance.  Moreover, even if the Majority is correct, a 
declaratory judgment can act to “restrain” the operation of § 
1226(c) even if it differs in effect from an injunction.  The 
question is not whether declaratory judgments and injunctions 
are equivalent; the question is whether a declaratory judgment 
acts to “restrain.”  As the Majority concedes, the judiciary 
presumes that officials of the Executive Branch adhere to our 
interpretations of the law.  Id. (citing Comm. on Judiciary v. 
Miers, 542 F.3d 909, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).  A declaratory 
  As the government 
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argues, the term “restrain” is simply broad:  Congress was so 
concerned about judicial second-guessing of its policy that it 
used a broad term in order to prevent it.  See Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (“Broad general 
language is not necessarily ambiguous when congressional 
objectives require broad terms.”);  In re Philadelphia 
Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 310 (3d Cir. 2010) (“As a 
general matter of statutory construction, a term in a statute is 
not ambiguous merely because it is broad in scope.”).  
Alli's class action petition for declaratory relief 
operates to “restrain” the operation of the law and is therefore 
barred by § 1252(f)(1).  In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme 
Court held that a plaintiff generally cannot file an action in 
federal court to enjoin a pending state prosecution.  401 U.S. 
37 (1971).  A companion case, Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 
66 (1971), recognized that allowing declaratory judgments in 
such cases would largely undermine Younger’s holding.  The 
Supreme Court explained that “the propriety of declaratory 
and injunctive relief should be judged by essentially the same 
standards.”  Id. at 72.  Applying this principle, the Supreme 
Court acknowledged that allowing declaratory judgments 
against pending state criminal prosecutions would (1) “serve 
as the basis for a subsequent injunction against those 
proceedings . . . and thus result in a clearly improper 
interference with the state proceedings,” and (2) “even if the 
declaratory judgment is not used as a basis for actually 
issuing an injunction, the declaratory relief alone [would 
have] virtually the same practical impact as a formal 
injunction . . . .”  Id. (emphasis added).  In this way, it 
recognized that a declaratory judgment had the same practical 
limiting effect on a state prosecution as an injunction.  Id. at 
73. (“Ordinarily, however, the practical effect of the two 
forms of relief will be virtually identical . . . .”) 
I am not persuaded by the Majority’s reliance on 
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), to dismiss this 
authority.  Steffel did not purport to overrule Samuels.  It 
merely acknowledged that “different considerations enter into 
                                                                                                     
judgment respecting an entire class of aliens surely 
“restrains,” i.e., “limits,” “restricts,” the Executive Branch's 
exercise of discretion over the members of that class.  
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a federal court’s decision as to declaratory relief, on the one 
hand, and injunctive relief, on the other.”  Steffel, 415 U.S. at 
469.  This is certainly true:  the decision to grant declaratory 
judgment is a purely discretionary one.  See Wilton v. Seven 
Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 287-88 (1995).  The question is 
whether the considerations that led the Supreme Court to 
decide in Samuels that allowing declaratory judgments would 
undermine its holding in Younger are also applicable here.  
They are.   
The concern in Samuels was that declaratory 
judgments would have the same practical effect of interfering 
with pending state proceedings as an injunction.  Here, the 
concern is that a declaratory judgment has the same practical 
effect of interfering with pending immigration proceedings in 
immigration courts established by Congress and administered 
by the Executive branch.  In both situations, a declaratory 
judgment will “serve as the basis for a subsequent injunction 
against those proceedings” and “even if the declaratory 
judgment is not used as a basis for actually issuing an 
injunction, the declaratory relief alone [would have] virtually 
the same practical impact as a formal injunction . . . .”  
Samuels, 401 U.S. at 72 (emphasis added).  This 
consideration was not present in Steffel, which reaches the 
sensible conclusion that a declaratory judgment action can be 
filed when there is no pending proceeding to interfere with.  
415 U.S. at 462. 
Furthermore, the fact that district courts must consider 
a variety of factors in deciding between declaratory and 
injunctive relief is irrelevant to whether a declaratory 
judgment “restrains.”  The Majority implies that a declaratory 
judgment only restrains if it is the “functional equivalent” of 
an injunction.  Maj. Op. at 13.  In this case, I believe that the 
two forms of relief are functionally equivalent.  But even if 
they are not—even if a declaratory judgment is a “milder” 
form of relief—a milder form of relief can still “limit,” 
“restrict” or “keep [someone] back from action.”  In this light, 
I am unconvinced that a declaratory judgment does not 
“restrain” the operation of § 1226(c).  
Indeed, if a declaratory judgment does not “restrain”—
that is “restrict, limit, confine” or “ keep . . . under control” 
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the operation of a law—then what does it do?  At its 
inception, the concept of declaratory relief was controversial 
because of the concern that such judgments were merely 
impermissible advisory opinions.  See 10B Charles Alan 
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2753 (3d ed. 
1998).  These concerns remain real, which is why courts are 
required to ensure that a declaratory judgment action presents 
an actual controversy and not just an abstract question of law.  
See Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp. 
of Am., 257 F.2d 485, 489 (3d Cir. 1958).  The “fundamental 
test is whether the plaintiff seeks merely advice or whether a 
real question of conflicting legal interests is presented for 
judicial determination.”  Id.  Here, it must be assumed that 
plaintiffs are seeking a determination of their legal rights as a 
class, not merely advice.  Surely the determination of the 
legal rights of an entire class of aliens “restrains” the 
Executive Branch’s legal authority over that class. See 
California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408 n.21 
(1982) (“In enacting the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress 
recognized the substantial effect declaratory relief would have 
on legal disputes.”). 
Second, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of similar 
statutory phrases also supports my reading of § 1252(f)(1).  
The Tax Injunction Act states that district courts “shall not 
enjoin, suspend or restrain the . . . collection of any tax under 
State law . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1341.  Recognizing that there is 
“little practical difference between injunctive and declaratory 
relief,” the Supreme Court held that this language stripped 
district courts of their jurisdiction to issue declaratory 
judgments as well as injunctions.  Grace Brethren Church, 
457 U.S. at 408.  Circuit courts interpreting the Johnson Act, 
which contains similar language limiting the ability of district 
courts to “enjoin, suspend or restrain the operation of” public 
utility rates set by state agencies, have reached the same 
conclusion:  the phrase “enjoin, suspend or restrain” covers 
declaratory relief.  See Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. 
Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 1991); Tennyson v. Gas 
Serv. Co., 506 F.2d 1135, 1139 (10th Cir. 1974).   
Alli is correct to point out that these statutes implicated 
concerns of federalism.  But I find this attempt to distinguish 
the cases more illuminating than discouraging:  if concerns of 
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federalism were enough to persuade the Supreme Court to 
conclude that declaratory judgments would “enjoin, suspend 
or restrain” state tax systems, analogous concerns of  inter-
branch relations would seem enough to conclude that class-
wide declaratory judgments would “enjoin or restrain” the 
operation of a system created by Congress and implemented 
by the Executive Branch. 
Third, § 1252(f)(1)’s reservation of jurisdiction in the 
Supreme Court does not support the Majority’s interpretation.  
The Majority’s argument runs as follows:  if “restrain” bars 
class actions seeking either an injunction or a declaratory 
judgment, then the district court would never have 
jurisdiction to certify a class; if the district court cannot have 
jurisdiction over a class action, there can never be appellate 
jurisdiction over a class action; if there is no appellate 
jurisdiction over a class action, then the Supreme Court could 
never have jurisdiction; thus, § 1252(f)(1) must allow 
jurisdiction over classes seeking declaratory relief.  The 
problem with this argument is that it proves too much.  Since 
Professor Neuman acknowledges that Article III jurisdiction 
is remedy-specific, his argument also demonstrates that the 
Supreme Court will never have jurisdiction to “enjoin” the 
operation of § 1226(c).  Gerald L. Neuman, Federal Courts in 
Immigration Law, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1661, 1686 (2000).  
Moreover, Professor Neuman recognizes that the scope of the 
Supreme Court’s authority to certify a class under its 
appellate jurisdiction is an open question.  Id.  The 
reservation of jurisdiction in the Supreme Court raises 
interesting issues of abstract law, but it has no bearing on the 
meaning of the word “restrain” and does nothing to support 
the Majority’s interpretation. 
Fourth, because the statute is not ambiguous, we do 
not need to look to other portions of the statute for guidance.  
Alli concedes that the title of a statute does not trump its plain 
text; the title is relevant only as a tool to resolve doubt about 
its meaning.  See Appellant Br. at 16 n.6; see also 
Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 
212 (1998) (“The title of a statute . . .cannot limit the plain 
meaning of the text.”) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  Here, I have no doubts about its meaning.  And 
even if I did, if “limit on injunctive relief” “mean[s] what it 
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says,” Maj. Op. at 11, then it would be silly to allow class-
wide injunctions as long as plaintiffs use two steps—a class 
action for declaratory relief followed by individual injunction 
actions—instead of one.2
In my view, the Majority’s strongest argument 
regarding statutory context is that the closely adjacent 
provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(A) prohibits “declaratory, 
injunctive, or other equitable relief.”  However I do not see 
the relevance of the use of the term “declaratory” in § 
1252(e)(1).  The absence of that term in § 1252(f)(1) does not 
mean that Congress did not want to prevent actions for 
declaratory relief.  Indeed, if I am right, Congress used the 
unambiguous word “restrain” because the word has a broad 
meaning that would encompass declaratory judgments.  The 
words used in § 1252(f)(1) make it plain that the section is 
broader in scope than § 1252(e)(1)(A).  The latter section, 
which applies to individual aliens, uses nouns to prohibit 
specific forms of relief.  Section 1252(f)(1) seeks to limit a 
remedy that applies to entire classes and, to achieve that aim, 
uses broad verbs—”enjoin or restrain”—that encompass a 
range of court actions.  See Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 
   
                                              
2  The illusion that a class-wide declaratory judgment 
ultimately differs in effect from a class-wide injunction 
quickly dissipates once it becomes apparent that every single 
member of the class can, and will, immediately seek an 
injunction grounded on the authority of the declaratory 
judgment. See Samuels, 401 U.S. at 72 (noting that a 
declaratory judgment can serve as the basis for a subsequent 
injunction); Stoetzner v. U.S. Steel Corp., 897 F.2d 115, 119 
(3d Cir. 1990) (observing that “an action maintainable under 
both [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23](b)(2) and (b)(3) 
should be treated under (b)(2) to enjoy its superior res 
judicata effect and to eliminate the procedural complications 
of (b)(3), which serve no useful purpose under (b)(2)”) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  Of course, § 
1252(f)(1) allows an individual to bring an injunction, but this 
misses the point.  A class-wide declaratory judgment, 
followed by individual injunctions from every member of the 
class is, in every consequence that matters, the same as a 
class-wide injunction.  This is precisely the restraint that § 
1252(f)(1) purports to prevent. 
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F.3d at 310 (“In employing intentionally broad language, 
Congress avoids the necessity of spelling out in advance 
every contingency to which a statute could apply.”).  That 
Congress uses different words to accomplish different 
objectives in different sections of a statute does not render its 
commands ambiguous.  
Finally, Alli argues that he is not seeking a declaratory 
judgment to restrain the operation of the statute, but only to 
prevent a violation of it. This is legal sleight of hand.  Alli 
wants to obtain a declaration that the Executive Branch’s 
execution of the law is unconstitutional.  This is an attempt to 
“restrain”—to “keep in check or under control” the Executive 
Branch’s execution of the law.   
In short, the language of § 1252(f)(1) states that courts 
have no jurisdiction to enjoin or restrain the operation of 
immigration detention laws as they apply to entire classes of 
aliens.  I believe that a declaratory judgment,  no less than an 
injunction, is such a restraint.  For that reason, I would affirm 
the District Court.  
